AmbassadorBlog

Netanyahu 2, Abbas 1, & Obama 0

If we were keeping score on the question of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel based on the New York meeting on Tuesday, we would have to award Prime Minister Netanyahu two points, the Palestinian President Abbas one point, and President Obama no points.  Obama certainly did not get much joy from Netanyahu in New York.  In the peace process, as an American negotiator, you can gauge how well you are doing by the number of right wing Israeli settlers protesting outside the Prime Minister's residence after a round of talks. The streets were empty today.  Of course, you can always count on the Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman to tell it like it is without the diplomatic coating that Netanyahu is so careful to preserve.  According to the Israeli press, Lieberman said on Wednesday that Netanyahu's summit with Obama was a victory because it took place even though Israel rebuffed Obama's demand on settlements. Member of Knesset Danny Danon, from Likud's right flank was obviously jubilant and, at the same time insulting to President Obama when saying that he hopes "the summit stops the Hollywood movie in which Obama lives."

We do not know what went on in private between Obama and Netanyahu.  We don't know if there were promises made.  But Dennis Ross, who was in on the meetings, went down this road with me before in negotiations with Netanyahu the last time he was Prime Minister.  So Dennis knows that what is said in private does not always occur in fact. And, to be honest, how could the Prime Minister of Israel accommodate a full settlement freeze or a serious lockdown on expansion given the government he has cobbled together.  No Israeli Prime Minister has been able to do this in a sustained way in the past, and Netanyahu is a most unlikely candidate to be the exception. Look at the numbers and tell me how Netanyahu could sustain his government if he compromises on the settlements issue.  He can't even count on the right wing of his Likud party, let alone Yisrael Beitenu, Jewish Home, or the United Torah Judaism party.  George Mitchell knows better.  He made it clear after the meeting that a settlement showdown is not a precondition for resuming negotiations.   And Netanyahu made clear that the settlements issue can only be considered in the context of the final status negotiations.  "But we have to talk in order to talk about it," Netanyahu said. 

But what will they talk about?  That is the question Obama has to face.  If the Israeli coalition government would fall over the settlements issue, would it not be more likely to fall over any compromise or even any gesture on Jerusalem?  Or on refugees?  And how are we going to negotiate borders without impinging on settlements? This is déjà vu for me.  We seem to be fighting our way back to Menahem Begin's formula for Palestinian autonomy - a Palestinian government in the mind but not on the ground.  That no doubt would satisfy Prime Minister Netanyahu and his coalition. 

But what about the Palestinians?  The pressure was not on them in this round.  They have just as many internal political problems as the Israelis do.  Only in Abu Mazen's case the costs of compromise are likely to be renewed civil war and violence and possibly even his life.  So the Palestinians probably sighed a sigh of relief that they got out of New York without having to challenge Hamas and without undercutting their relationship with President Obama while leaving Israel to take the blame. 

Perhaps President Obama will have to stop thinking about this problem in the short term and stop looking for a quick fix.  It seems clear that no progress is possible on the critical issues so long as the Israeli government continues in its current configuration.  And in all probability no progress can really be expected so long as the Palestinians are a hair's breadth away from committing mutual suicide.  So perhaps the Palestinian Prime Minister Salem Fayyed has it right.  This may be the time for the Palestinians to get their act together and form a credible government in the service of the Palestinian people.  And it may be time for Israelis to consider their future and decide whether or not they want peace to be held hostage by a rigid minority of the settler movement.  Or we can just mark time until Palestinians living on land from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean outnumber their Jewish neighbors.  Then what?

Arab gestures, facts on the ground, and the shrill hysteria of incitement.

As a part of the package the Obama Administration is working out with Israel on the settlements freeze and return to negotiations, there is reportedly a promise of some gestures from the Arab world in the form of opening trade offices and providing overflight rights for Israeli commercial aircraft to link Israel to Asia. Arguably, these would be positive steps in creating a better atmosphere for peace, but would they make a significant difference? In fact, they are not likely to change attitudes where they count the most - in Israel and Palestine.

Last June, The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace published a poll of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian attitudes toward peace (http://truman.huji.ac.il/poll-view.asp?id=279). The results were not very encouraging.  While the majority of Israeli Jews felt that the conflict with the Palestinians imposed a high to unbearable cost on Israel, a similar number believed that Israel could bear that price for decades and even forever.  What those numbers should be telling the Arab rejectionists and the hostile regime elements in Gaza is that Israel can live with a sustained level of violence indefinitely.  Too many Palestinians got the wrong message from the Israeli excursions into Lebanon and their withdrawal under pressure.  In fact, if the shelling from Gaza starts up again, most Israelis believe a military solution to that problem is possible.  30% would reoccupy Gaza and over half of all Israelis think that Israel can overthrow the Hamas regime in Gaza if it so desires.

What I found striking about the poll was the fact that 62% of Jewish Israelis thought that the aspiration of the Arabs, in the long run, was to conquer the state of Israel and of that number, 42% thought the goal was to destroy a significant part of the Jewish population in Israel.  If that is your assumption about the people you are expected to negotiate with, then the price for any concessions would seem to be too high. This cynical attitude about the prospects of living in peace is reflected at many points in the survey on both sides.  65% of Palestinians and 63% of Israelis believe it is impossible to reach a final status settlement these days.

Gestures by the Bahrainis or Qataris, or any other Arab state, are not going to change these numbers.  To imagine that peace is possible on this foundation of deep mutual antipathy and mistrust really stretches credulity. Peace may be a function of Prime Ministers and Presidents, but it is ultimately dependent on the people of both sides.  Confidence has to be built from somewhere below zero where it currently resides.  That will only happen when the voices of reason can out-shout the voices of intolerance and irrationality, when children are taught facts rather than slogans, when the media no longer points the camera at the loudest voice in the room, and when we get back to efforts to purge ourselves, our schools and our media of incitement.

We tried it once in 1998 as a result of the Wye agreement.  We formed an anti-incitement committee and even had meetings for several months.  Unfortunately, only the Americans took it seriously. As a result, it was still born. Perhaps the Obama Administration should consider leading a new effort, but this time with the energy and eloquence of the President of the United States. Peace is not going to come from clever formulas and untenable compromises.  It will only come when the people who are most affected want it to come, and believe in it.  That is not the case today.   

The Thirteenth Palestinian Government

From the earliest days, once the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat forced the United States back in 1978 to take an active role in resolving the Palestinian problem, we have largely focused our efforts on security and the key final status issues like borders and Jerusalem.  President Bush embraced the  policy of a two state solution, but aside from some discussions in the context of the Autonomy negotiations and in the Oslo process years ago, there has been very little focus on what the Palestinian State will look like, how it will be organized and what are the premises on which it will be based. Presumably, these are questions that the Palestinians will have to answer in due course.  But, it is very hard for me to imagine that Israel, or for that matter the United States, is a disinterested party.  Will the Palestinian state look like Gaza under Hamas?  If that is the expectation then it is not very likely that negotiations on the final status, even if started, would ever result in an agreement.  

What we have all known for a long time is that Israel will not accept a hostile, independent state in the West Bank and Gaza and nor should it.  If there was ever any doubt of this, all we need to do is to examine the Israeli and US reaction to Hamas' rule over Gaza.  The Israelis will have to know who their neighbors are and will have to have a high degree of confidence that once a Palestinian state is established, it will not become a launching pad for attacks on Israel.  Without a substantial degree of mutual confidence, issues like security, settlements, borders, Jerusalem and refugees cannot be resolved.  This is not only a question of lines on a map.  It is also a question of intentions.

Certainly, the Palestinian record thus far does not fill one with confidence.  The divided polity, the clinging to rhetoric instead of reality, the record of corruption in the Palestinian National Authority,  and failure to govern effectively even in areas where the Authority has sway, creates the expectation of failure, instability, and continued hostility toward Israel as the path of least resistance.  Palestinians have been reluctant to take on the hard issues of coming to grips with their internal differences using the excuse that with the Israelis hovering over every decision and intervening at will, the Palestinians cannot determine their own vision or begin the construction of their own state.  They have been unwilling to take the difficult steps of forging a common Palestinian vision and policy in the absence of the concrete governmental structure of a State in being - until now.  

Now the Palestinian National Authority is advancing a new approach in its program of the thirteenth government entitled "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State" published in August 2009.  This is a document that has received little notice in the media, but which lays out a picture of a Palestinian state that could, if implemented, enable a constructive process of peace making.  The document includes a forward by Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Prime Minister that sets out the objectives of the Government for the next two years as a "full commitment to this state-building endeavor" and emphasizes that such a program is "critical" to the "creation of the independent state of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital."  Fayyad's formulation in his cover letter is interesting since it is not found in the document itself.  He refers to "East" Jerualem - the document consistently refers to "Jerusalem" without any modifier.  The document itself has problems such as repeated references to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which established the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees to their homes based on their free choice.  However, the document assigns responsibility of dealing with the refugees to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and not to the Palestinian Authority or its government.  

The agenda that the program of the 13th government has set out is surprisingly detailed, which is unusual for political documents that have to appeal to a broad constituency.  What is even more surprising is the level of self-criticism that is implied by the document. Repeated references to the need for auditing government functions would appear to be in response to the heavy criticism of the Authority as being corrupt.  It would also tend to indicate that over the 17 years that the Palestinian Authority has been in existence, virtually no reforms have taken place, no strategic plan has been developed, no consensus on goals and vision has been reached, and that there has been little or no effort to establish the foundation for a viable Palestinian state.  A lot of the credit for this dysfunctional history has to be laid at the feet of Yasser Arafat whose style of governing was divide, conquer and never decide. 

While one could nit-pick the program. Certainly there are aspects that will cause heartburn particularly within the Palestinian community, but also among some Israelis.  Furthermore, there is a long distance between statements of intention and facts on the ground.  It remains to be seen if Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad can deliver on the vision and reform.   But it is virtually certain, in my view, that without such an effort on the part of the Palestinians, there will be no peace agreement, no Palestinian state, and no respite from terrorism.  The program's success is, as Prime Minister Fayyad says, essential if a peace agreement is to be reached. The program is predicated on and designed to help achieve the unification of the Palestinian polity, without which I do not give the peace process a snowball's chance of succeeding.  This is the very first time that we have seen a concrete, rational, official Palestinian projection of what a Palestinian state might look like and how it could sustain peace as a democracy based on the rule of law. That has been an important missing ingredient in all the past efforts to concoct a peace between Israelis and the Palestinians. We should give Salam Fayyad our full support and help him make his vision real.  

245- "A Time for Every Season"

President Obama said on April 11, in his weekly radio and Internet address that major obstacles such as climate change, the global financial crisis, terrorism and nuclear proliferation demand coordinated action to overcome.  He said. "These are challenges that no single nation, no matter how powerful, can confront alone,"  "The United States must lead the way. But our best chance to solve these unprecedented problems comes from acting in concert with other nations."

It is a nice sentiment, and on the face of it, it seems logical and persuasive.  But can the world act in concert? And on what? The one overriding truth of the nation state system as we know it is that states will act in their own perceived self-interest even if that comes at the expense of other states and long term goals. And the perception of self-interest is almost inevitably short term. It would certainly seem to be in the broad interest of mankind to curtail carbon emissions and at least slow global warming.  But polar bears are not as important as the  survival and competitive advantage of your business community and the jobs and profits they produce.  And the lobbyists and shareholders of those businesses are not likely to let up the pressure on their members of Congress to reach global agreements that give competitive advantage to China or India. 

Recent history has not been kind to global efforts to solve problems.  The Doha round is dead - the victim of conflicting North-South interests and the inability of nation states to compromise when faced with political pressure at home.  The  Fifth World Conference on Women was deferred in 2005 due to fear that the gains of the 1995 conference would be lost in the face of positions on abortion and the human rights of women adopted by the Bush administration.  United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, is set for 7-18 December 2009, but success is far from certain.  The Obama administration is currently in the process of back tracking from early statements on climate change and a cap and trade system for carbon emissions.

The United Nations Security Council has been blocked from effective action in Darfur to save lives and has been unable to confront Sudan’s president Bashir to restore humanitarian aid to its former level. The International Criminal Court issued an indictment of Bashir, which the African Union and Arab League ignored.  The Security Council cannot even act effectively to enforce its own resolution against North Korean missile testing and had to settle for a watered down Presidential statement, which everyone knows who has worked at the UN is a toothless face saver for an embarrassed Council.  Afghanistan is going backwards as NATO countries argue over policy and participation.  The President is rebuffed by the Iranians in his effort to open a door.  And he was far short of his goals at the G20.  Where is the leadership that President Obama is talking about?

In the early 90’s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world came together and marked major progress on trade, intellectual property, population problems, women’s rights, and a plethora of Security Council, NATO, and AU interventions in global hot spots.  Education about global health and international systems to deal with pandemics were instituted. Growth pulled millions of people out of poverty.  Most of the world, except for the United States came together on climate change at Kyoto. 

The difference between then and now was that then wealth was expanding and more people and states could share in the pie.  Today, contraction means that states and individuals are trying to hold on to those larger slices at the expense of others.  The industrialized country leadership has pledged to avoid protectionism, but protectionism is insidious and does not have to mean new openly restrictive measures.  It can mean the failure to correct existing imbalances that favor the few at the expense of the many.  For example, it can mean the collapse of negotiations over agriculture in the Doha round.  Protectionism can mean the failure to reach agreement on a new climate agreement at the UN Conference in December.  It can mean buy America provisions in legislation and failure to compete for massive new expenditures under the stimulus package.

Perhaps this is not a time for bold new international initiatives.  Perhaps we should take a page out of the book of the organizers of the Fifth World Conference on Women and be satisfied to protect that which has already been gained and defer that which exceeds our capacity right now while we work to restore growth and wealth.  President Obama is correct that our future depends on our ability to act in concert with others.  But in that process, we have to be realistic about the nature of that concert.  Let us focus on what can be done now and leave for later global initiatives that will inevitably divide us today and create a downward spiral of beggar thy neighbor.

305 - A New Al Qaeda Strategy?

On Friday, March 27, President Obama announced his plans for Afghanistan focusing on the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  “The situation is increasingly perilous,” he said. He also warned that al Qaeda “is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan.”  He added: “We have a clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”  Obama will deploy 4,000 more troops in addition to the 17,000 he has already commited adding up to more than 60,000 troops.  Expenditures will increase about 60% above the current $2 billion a month to about $3.2 billion a month.  The 82nd Airborne Division, rather than reservists, will act as trainers to double the Afghan army to 134,000 by 2011.  He also called for a dramatic increase in US development assistance for both countries, significantly increased US civilian presence on the ground and a five year program for Pakistan of $1.5 billion a year.  Finally, he said that we would establish benchmarks as we had done in Iraq over the past two years. 

If all of this sounds vaguely familiar, it is no surprise since the team that gave you Iraq over the past two years is the same team that is now in charge in Afghanistan. While we have certainly made progress in Iraq and the team deserves considerable credit for the change, the question is whether or not the same medicine will work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The conditions are quite different.  The topography in Waziristan and Afghanistan is a terrorist’s dream compared to the topography in Iraq.  The tribal culture is far more intense and tightly knit in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq.  The poverty level is considerably greater in Afghanistan and the educational level lower.  If you want to fuel terrorism, what you need is poverty and money.  And the Taliban has both.  The money comes from the drug trade, the poverty is a given.  And with money, you can buy support and corrupt the institutions of government that could stand against you. 

One wonders whether or not with $3.2 billion a month we could not outspend, out-corrupt and out-buy the Taliban.  That is not the way we want to operate, but until we can dry up the Taliban and al-Qaeda financial resources and immunize the local population from the Taliban’s bribary and barbarity, it is hard to see how we will be able to develop the system of intelligence and local reporting that can defeat our enemies.  NATO continues to be divided on how to deal with the Opium industry since it is the lifeblood of so many Afghanis.  But unless we can come up with an effective strategy for strangling Taliban and al-Qaeda resources, any gains we may make are likely to be subject to reversal.

But lets look on the positive side.  Let’s say we are fully effective and we can blunt the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the question I have to ask is whether or not we will have solved the problem of al Qaeda? There are some clues that are worrisome.

March 17, 2009, Yemeni security authorities said that a suicide bomber who killed four South Korean tourists in Yemen was trained in Somalia.  Acording to a Reuters report, tens of thousands of Somali refugees arrive in Yemen each year while the Yemen government fights an insurgency in the north putting Yemen at risk of becoming a failed state.  Yemen’s problems could then spill over into Saudi Arabia.  Yemen authorities have rounded up dozens of militants linked to al-Qaeda.

On March 18, 2009 another man blew himself up in Yemen trying to attack South Korean investigators.  These attacks followed calls by Al Qaeda leaders for attacks on non-Muslim foreigners in the Arabian Peninsula.

On February 25 the press reported that Islamist militants in Somalia have rejected any compromise and will fight until Somalia is a strict Islamist state.  Meanwhile educated Somalis are leaving the country in droves.

On March 25 the press reported that a tape released by the al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahri called on the Sudanese to undertake jihad against the “crusade” being orchestrated by the West against Sudan. 

In January 2009 the press reported that a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Abu Sayyaf al-Shihri, released to Saudi Arabia, had shown up in Yemen as the deputy leader of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch.

According to the Timesonline in July 2008, success in Iraq against al-Qaeda has led the terrorists to flee to Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Thailand with the largest contingent going to North Africa.  An arc of terror is taking shape in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, according to the article. 

There is more, but on the face of it, victory in Iraq has led to an enhanced al-Qaeda presence in failed states where Islamic fundamentalism has taken root and training facilities can sustain a steady conveyor belt of suicide bombers and fighters. So the question is, can we afford to focus all our attention and resources on Pakistan and Afghanistan while al-Qaeda turns its attention to the more accommodating environments of failed states?  In short, can we afford to turn our backs on Darfur, Somalia, Yemen and a number of other states that are at risk?  

305 - Peacekeeping: the Sorcerer's Apprentice

On May 29, 1948, the UN Security Council called for a cease-fire in the Arab-Israel war of 1948 and set up the foundation for the first UN peacekeeping mission by calling for military observers to assist the UN Mediator and the Truce Commission in overseeing the cease-fire.  The result became the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Resolution 50 incorporated about a page of text and was limited to 12 paragraphs, which were each one sentence long.

On May 21, 2004, the Security Council issued its resolution number 1545 establishing the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), a peacekeeping operation.  That resolution has three pages of single spaced text in the preamblular paragraphs alone and five pages of 23 operational paragraphs. 
Whereas Resolution 50 simply called for a ceasefire and limits on introducing fighting personnel into the conflict, Resolution 1545 authorized the UN peacekeeping operation as well, but then it went on to set out its structure, size, and mandate.  Its mandate included monitoring the ceasefire, investigating violations, promoting confidence building measures, providing security at pre-disarmament assembly sites, collecting weapons, dismantling militias, quartering the Burundi Armed forces, monitoring illegal flow of arms, creating security for humanitarian efforts, protecting civilians and UN personnel.  Then it adds the responsibility to advise the government of Burundi on refugees, institutional reforms, electoral activities, reform of the judiciary, and promotion of human rights.  Like the brooms of the Sorcerer’s apprentice, the number of paragraphs in Security Council resolutions just keep on growing.
By the time we get to 2006, the Security Council is issuing a resolution, number 8928 calling on Iran to halt uranium enrichment and providing for sanctions.  That resolution is 10 pages long of single spaced text and goes into every detail of the impending sanctions.

In 2008 the Security Council passed 63 resolutions and in 2007, 55.  While this is a decrease from the 100 plus resolutions passed each year in the early 1990s, it still raises the question of man hours devoted to extremely complicated and comprehensive resolutions that seek not only to keep the peace, but also to restructure the states involved in conflict.  It also calls into question the ability of the members of the Security Council to absorb and decide on the details of peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and nation building that dominate the recent Security Council approaches to peacekeeping.  The Secretary General and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) are calling the new resolutions “multi-dimensional.”  

With over 100,000 military and civilian personnel at headquarters and deployed in 16 missions abroad and a DPKO budget off about $7 billion, the peacekeeping functions of the UN dwarf its other responsibilities. The budget for the rest of the Secretariat was $1.9 billion in 2006. Keep in mind that in 1991 there was no Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Now there is a large and growing bureaucracy with vested interest in the perpetuation of ever more complex missions to guard against the failures of the past.  

The question we have to ask now is who is running whom? The member states no longer control the process.  Their staffs are dwarfed by the DPKO.  Even the largest mission in New York, the US mission, would be lost without the full resources of the US government in Washington to keep track of and make decisions on the proposals for peacekeeping provided to the Security Council by the Secretary General based on lengthy reports and recommendations of the DPKO. 

The second question that needs to be asked is “Is all of this necessary.”  We seemed to stumble along with a more limited number of missions and much more narrow objectives in the first 40 years of the UN’s existence. Do we really want the UN in the business of nation building?  In whose image? And under whose direction? The world did not fall apart when it ignored most local conflicts before the 1990s.  And if there was a problem in the area of peacekeeping, that problem appeared to be generated more by headquarters mistrust and dismissal of its commanders and representatives on the ground. Now DPKO is trying to determine every detail of a mission and take away the flexibility of the people running the show in the field who probably are in a position to know and understand a fast moving situation better than a bureaucrat in New York.  Brian Urqhart, long time Undersecretary with responsibility for peacekeeping before the advent of the DPKO, wrote: “Care should be taken in attempting to generalize and improve upon what has been part of the recipe for success [of United Nations peacekeeping], namely improvisation.”   (Robert A. Rubinstein, “Peacekeeping under Fire” Paradigm Publishers, Boulder CO, 2008, Chapter 2, page 22)

UN Peacekeeping - cheap at twice the price?

United Nations peacekeeping has been heavily criticized in books, articles, speeches and in our own Congress.  Criticisms have focused on the UN bureaucracy, the long lead time for establishing a peacekeeping mission, the failure of peacekeeping missions to completely fulfill their mandate, and, particularly, the handful of missions that went very badly wrong.  UN peacekeeping has become defined by Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sudan and not the other 58 peacekeeping missions that have been established by the Security Council since 1948.   

One of the harshest critics was John Bolton who served as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 2005 and 2006.  Interestingly, the Security Council approved over 100 resolutions in this period,  according to the record, Bolton voted for all of them. Since 1991, the United States has voted for over 1100 Security Council Resolutions.  And, in fact, the United States voted for all resolutions that were passed relating to Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan.  One would assume that it the United Nations peacekeeping operations are so flawed, the United States, which helps negotiate the enabling resolutions, would balk from time to time and issue a veto. 

There is no doubt that peacekeeping, as the UN practices it could be more efficient and more effective, but there easier or cheaper alternatives if we want international authorization and approval.  Without that approval, it becomes extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible to attract troop contributors. Some countries are precluded by domestic legislation from participating in a peacekeeping mission that is not sanctioned by the UN.

There are other optiions.  Regional organizations like NATO and the African Union have engaged in peacekeeping with mixed results.  The United States has composed ad hoc coalitions of the willing, with limited UN cover.  And the United States created a special purpose peacekeeping operation outside of the UN system in the Sinai with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission to monitor the Israeli Egyptian peace.  It incorporates troop contributions from 11 different countries and is composed of about 3000 military and civilian personnel.   In 1993, the MFO operating budget was $56.1 million and while this cost was divided into thirds by Egypt, Israel and the US, the actual US cost was much higher since the Department of Defense absorbed the cost of the US troops, which amounted to $46.6 million.  While the MFO total cost is not out of line with UN mission costs for equivalent missions, the US contribution is significantly greater than the 25% we pay for UN missions.  In short, the UN is a bargain when it comes to peacekeeping and yet still Congress complains.  

The fact that the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was anxious to cancel our participation in the MFO, suggests that the drain on US resources in terms of lift, logistics and retraining would exceed by a considerable margin the impact of a UN peacekeeping mission on our readiness.  So the question is not whether we should advocate unilateral or regional peacekeeping over UN missions, but which missions to mount through the UN. Or, more appropriately, when to pull the plug on a UN mission that has gone sour or is not fulfilling its mandate. 

In the case of Bosnia, which started with a peacekeeping mission in Croatia to provide security for three UN protected zones, all the proper steps in terms of getting agreement of the combatants were in place and the mission was operational, until the mission was expanded and the original mandate changed.  At that point the Security Council, advised by the military commander in the field, should have taken steps to provide adequate resources to do the job and to renegotiate agreement for the mission by the combatants or it should have pulled the troops home and terminated the mission.  Similarly, there were points in Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan where the game changed from the original concept sold to the Security Council and on which the peacekeeping missions were based.  In each case there should have been a reevaluation and conclusion that unless conditions were again favorable, the missions would have to be aborted. This is easier said than done. 

Public opinion and pride seem to stand in the way of considered military judgment.  The Secretary General does not want to encourage unilateralism or admit that the UN cannot handle the job and the members of the Security Council are reluctant to back away from doing something to relieve an humanitarian crisis, which has captured the attention of CNN.  Everyone seems to have his eye on his own reputation or standing in the public eye more than on the humanitarian tragedy that is unfolding.  The result is that the United Nations is discredited and its future ability to help devalued and people suffer. 

   

A Democratic Alliance of Development

The President elect has pledged action on the issues of energy supply and global warming.  He has been outspoken on the Darfur “genocide” and has criticized some African leaders for corruption.  He has a close advisor in Susan Rice who is well versed in the problems of Africa, having been Assistant Secretary of State under President Clinton.  She brings knowledge of AIDS, global poverty, conflict and terrorism as these issues relate to Africa.  And while Obama will have many priority issues to deal with when he takes office, he should be carful not to relegate the Africa related issues to the back-bench.  He should also be aware, as I am sure Susan is, that the problems that plague Africa cannot be dealt with in isolation from one another.

Aside from the humanitarian interests, the existence of al-Qaeda franchises in Algeria and Morocco, threaten not only those countries but Europe as well.  If failed states are, indeed, a Petri dish for the growth of terrorism, then Africa is an incubator.  The problems in a number of countries feed on each other.  Impoverishment, overpopulation, lack of resources, lack of education, corruption of leadership, draught and disease are the handmaidens of a failed state.  Global warming promises greater problems in the future, as arid areas expand and food crops contract.  Diseases like malaria will threaten new areas as warming and humidity patterns change.  And those individuals who manage to attain a higher level of education will be lured away by higher salaries than impoverished states and institutions can afford to pay.

Foreign assistance, external forces, sanctions, and mediation are among the few tools available to the West, to exert leverage for change.  If the mantra of the Obama Administration in America is “change,” it is all the more appropriate for the failing states of Africa.  Too often, our tools for change are blunt instruments or are not suited to the job.  While sanctions may have worked in Libya, they seem to have little impact on Sudan other than to increase the plight of the average Sudanese citizen.  Foreign forces can perhaps stabilize a situation, but are poorly designed to repair a country.  As for foreign assistance, it seems to have little lasting effect in the absence of good governance, corruption and the cleptocracies that prevail in too many countries.  It is a noble thought to expect that programs like the Millennium Challenge Account can impact on a failed state.  But the very nature of the Account precludes it from investing in a failed state.  Good governance is not an attribute that is in great demand in the most desperate countries where the watchword among the authorities is “take what you can get.”  Another major engine for growth in a developing economy, foreign direct investment is also not available given confiscatory laws, instability, xenophobia and other deterrents to rational investment.  And it is not at all clear that traditional aid programs, which seek to build infrastructure and bottom up development, are equal to the task, particularly when aid personnel are constantly under the threat of attack and death. 

While it is tempting to allow failed states to go their own way and devolve into chaos, the problem is that they too often are infectious to their neighbors and offer a safe haven to thugs, criminals, and terrorists.  But if our traditional tools are inadequate to deal with the problems of rebuilding societies, then perhaps the new administration should begin over and, working with other democratic states, building on some of the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan, Northern Ireland and other crisis spots, and using the lessons of the past in terms of foreign assistance and private investment, build a new model for international intervention in situations like Sudan. 

An international study group of counter terrorist, foreign policy, political experts, and development experts, freed of the institutional jealousies, stereotypes and prejudices of existing institutions, might be able to offer a basis for international cooperation among like minded governments to deal with the disease of failed states.  While I am not an advocate of the concept of a league of democracies, in this case, an international effort among democracies might be able to propose credible policies and institutions that could deal effectively with issues like global poverty, disease, corruption, hunger and other destabilizing forces. Certainly, more of the same, as we have seen over the past decade, is not going to work. 

The Terror Track of Negotiations

On October 31, 2008, the State Department announced that the Government of Libya had deposited $1.5 billion through a humanitarian fund into a US controlled account, which will go to compensate American claimants who have terrorism-related claims against Libya. A number of other steps were also taken to settle all terrorism claims against the Libyan government that were before our courts.  The principle claimants for these funds are the families of the victims of Pan Am 103 and the 1986 LaBelle Disco attack in Berlin.  At the same time, the Libyans are to receive $300 million for the victims of the US airstrikes on Libya after the LaBelle Disco attack. That money will come from donations and not from US government or taxpayer funds. Payment of the claims now opens the way for appointment of an Ambassador to our Embassy in Libya.

The resolution of the problem with Libya came about through secret negotiations with the Libyan authorities in 1999 and 2000, initiated by then Assistant Secretary Indyk and continued under my direction when I took over from Martin at State.  We began these negotiations when Libya was still designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” and, in fact, had been complicit in both the LaBelle operation and the Pan Am 103 act.  With the election of 2000, and subsequent change of administration, the portfolio was sidelined for a period by the Bush administration.  When I briefed Secretary Powell, shortly after President Bush took office, Powell was surprised that these negotiations had taken place,  and even more surprised that they had been kept secret. 

The Bush administration picked up the negotiations once again After the 9/11 attack and in August 2003 Libya finally agreed to pay about $2.7 million in compensation to the victims of the PA 103 bombing and to deliver a letter to the UN Security Council accepting responsibility for the attack.  Then in December 2003, Libya announced that is was giving up its weapons of mass destruction program as a result of secret negotiations between US and UK intelligence agencies. 
From the very beginning of Martin’s and my negotiations we had structured the talks with the Libyans on a stair step model so that when they did something we required, we would reciprocate with something they wanted.  The issues were related in the first instance to terrorism, but also included weapons of mass destruction led by the CIA and Libyan behavior in Africa, which was directed by then Assistant Secretary for Africa, Susan Rice.  It was a complicated negotiation from the outset, but ultimately extremely successful. 

It was always politically sensitive, particularly in the beginning when any leak would have caused a political firestorm from the families of victims and from Congress.  Secretary Albright and President Clinton took a real risk in authorizing us to proceed.

There are several important points about these negotiations.  First, there would not have been a successful resolution had we not agreed, in the first instance, to negotiate, face to face with the representatives of a State Sponsor of Terrorism, one that had cost multiple American lives.  Second, our success owed considerable debt to several foreign countries, starting with the United Kingdom, but also including the Saudis who hosted our initial talks, and the Egyptians and Palestinians who put pressure on Qaddafi.  Third, this was a victory of intelligence and diplomacy.  While Qaddafi may have been sobered by the US attack on Libya, which was allegedly designed to assassinate him, there was no indication from 1986 to 1999, that military action would change Qaddafi’s policy.  Fourth, this negotiation would never have succeeded had the Bush Administration not been willing to pursue a course that Clinton had started and charted.  President Bush could have made the Clinton negotiations public and caused considerable political damage for the Democrats.  He did not do so, which indicates the great advantage we have when our diplomacy is backed by bipartisan cooperation. 

With this bipartisan success, as well as the progress in the negotiations with the North Koreans, the question has to be asked why some politicians continue to oppose negotiations with our enemies.  If we can negotiate with Qaddafi, and Kim Jun Il why not Nasrallah of Hezbollah, or Haniyya of Hamas?  What is the difference? Is it the $1.5 billion dollars Qaddafi paid? Is it that Israel stands in our way?  And how could it be Israel when they have just concluded a deal with Hezbollah on release of prisoners and have been in negotiations with Hamas over the return of Gilad Shalit? It is a mystery to me how we can make these distinctions.  Isn’t it time for us to scrap the general policy of no negotiations with terrorists or their sponsors, and replace it with a judgment in each case as to the likelihood of a successful resolution, which is in the US interest? 

Pernicious Rumors

Shortly after September 11, 2001, I traveled to the Middle East and visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait.  There was a certain amount of sympathy for America at that time, but there were many very bizarre rumors and beliefs about the attack.  One very strong rumor was that Israel had managed the attack and evidence of that, it was said, was that Jews did not go to work in the twin towers that day.  The Israeli motivation was to discredit the Arab cause and Islam in the eyes of all Americans.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  I tried very hard to talk sense into some of my friends there with very little impact.  The second rumor was that it had not been Saudis or Arabs who had hijacked the aircraft and crashed into the twin towers and the pentagon.  It was really Mosad, or Israeli intelligence agents posing as Arabs.  Again, the beliefs were hard to shake.  What I found, as well, was total denial that Saudis or Egyptians or that UAE citizens could have been involved.  I probed deeper and found that the prevailing view was that Arabs could not have pulled off such an operation.  And because of this, it must have been Israel. 

Let’s fast forward now to 2008 and a New York Times article of September 9, a few days ago.  The title was “9/11 Rumors That Become Conventional Wisdom” by Michael Slackman.  Slackman probed Arab attitudes in a shopping mall in Dubai, in a park in Algiers, in a café in Riyadh and all over Cairo.  Over and over people told Slackman that they “did not believe that a group of Arabs – like themselves – could possibly have waged such a successful operation against a superpower like the United States.”  They were convinced that both the United States and Israel had to be involved at least in the planning of the operation.  It was too sophisticated and well coordinated and successful to have been an Arab planned operation.  As Slackman quotes a Cairo shopkeeper: “Maybe people who executed the operation were Arabs, but the brains? No way…It was organized by other people, the United States or the Israelis.”  The myth of jews not going to work that day had also persisted.  “Why is it that on 9/11, the Jews didn’t go to work in the building?”

The story has over time morphed from an Israeli plot to an American plot against Muslims with the help of Israel.  This change in perspective has come about because of American actions since 9/11.  “What matters is we think it was an attack against Arabs,” said an electrician in Cairo.  There does not seem to be any hesitation about believing that Americans would attack their own citizens to justify an invasion of an Arab country.  Then, of course, the fact that we did not find Bin Laden is absolute proof that we did not want to find him since he gave us the excuse to continue the fight against Islam. 

It was perhaps understandable in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that the Arab man on the street would have reached some bizarre conclusions about the events.  It is absolutely frightening that such attitudes have persisted and become part of the Arab landscape. 

As appalling as the persistence of these rumors is, it is equally appalling that the Arab man on the street has so little respect for Arab capabilities.  This sense of inferiority is a fundamental block to any form of negotiated settlement to the Palestinian issue.  Without the confidence that they can meet the Israelis on their own terms, they will continue to believe that whatever solution is reached, they will believe they were forced to make compromises.  That doesn’t augur well for a viable and sustainable agreement. 

It is equally problematic that the Arabs believe that the United States and Israel, that is the CIA and Mosad, can do whatever they want in the world and if they do not do it, it must be for a reason.  Then the speculation about the reason starts.  The inflated sense of our capabilities creates a problem for us when we do not carry through on our statements and promises. 

It is also a problem that people in the region apply their own experience and concepts of governance to us.  Hafez al Assad felt no remorse about attacking and destroying his own city of Hama – Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurds and murdered the Shiites.  There is no trust or confidence in the good intentions of political leaders in the region.  “Mubarak says whatever the Americans want him to say, and he’s lying for them, of course,” according to the shop keeper in Cairo.  And what applies to their own leaders must also apply in the United States.  Cynicism abounds and there are enough statements by religious and other bigots in the US to feed the idea that the US is hostile to Islam.

Does it really matter? I believe it does.  Ultimately, the war on terror depends on the man on the street.  He must help the authorities by reporting suspicious activates - the basic concept of a neighborhood watch.  He must support his government when it attacks terrorists.  And when the people support the terrorists and not those who oppose them, it makes if that much harder for leaders in the region actively to support our efforts.